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NOTES
such a result would "interfere with the legitimate interest of society
in enforcement of its laws and collection of the revenues. '23
In light of the Couch opinion, taxpayers and accountants alike
will have to re-evaluate present practices. Written agreements that
ownership of all materials shall remain with the taxpayer, and that
possession by the accountant is only temporary, may prove helpful.2"
Moreover, the accountant should return all materials to the taxpayer
immediately after his services are completed. Perhaps arranging the
performance of the accountant's service on the taxpayer's business
premises will avoid the Couch issue. The need for assistance in so
complex a tax structure coupled with the right to be secure in one's
private dealings with confidants, must be accorded its proper weight
in balancing the interest of maintaining a consistent flow of revenue
with our deeply rooted notion of governmental fair play.
T. Victor Jackson
VERBAL ABUSE AND THE AGGRESSOR DOCTRINE
An argument arose between plaintiff and defendant. When de-
fendant warned plaintiff not to use profanity in front of his wife,
plaintiff replied that she heard worse every day from the defendant.
As a result defendant struck plaintiff, who sustained injuries. The
Louisiana supreme court held, words alone could not justify the strik-
ing, although they could be considered in mitigation of damages.
Morneau v. American Oil Co., 272 So. 2d 313 (La. 1973).
One of the curiosities of Louisiana tort law has been the so-called
"aggressor" doctrine. The rule is said to be that "one who is himself
in fault cannot recover damages for a wrong resulting from such fault,
although the party inflicting the injury was not justifiable under the
laws."' Thus recovery has been denied in suits for assault and battery
where the plaintiff was found to have provoked the incident, even
though the conduct of the defendant was not self-defense. Sufficient
provocation has been held to include, in addition to acts of physical
violence, "insults, abuse, threats, or other conduct calculated to
ity opinion stressed the fact that the accountant was not the taxpayer's employee, but
was an independent contractor.
23. 93 S. Ct. 611, 620 (1973).
24. See United States v. Re, 313 F. Supp. 442, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
1. Vernon v. Bankston, 28 La. Ann. 710, 711 (1876).
2. Fontenelle v. Waguespack, 150 La. 316, 90 So. 662 (1922).
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arouse resentment or fear,"' 3 although a conflicting line of jurisprud-
ence holds that words alone cannot justify an assault and battery.,
In the instant case the supreme court stated that the correct rule
with regard to words as provcation had always been that stated by it
in 1874: "[M]ere words, no matter how calculatedly they were used
to excite or irritate, cannot justify a battery. Provocation by words,
however, can be considered in mitigation of damages although re-
jected as justification for an unlawful act."5 The court referred to the
conflicting line of cases as "deviations" and said that they were con-
trary to the majority rule in this country and contrary to "our system
of justice under law." 6 The court did not refer to the aggressor doc-
trine as such, nor did it refer to types of provocation other than "mere
words."
In the instant case, the court placed Louisiana in accord with the
great majority of other jurisdictions in the United States.7 Provoca-
tive words alone can never justify a battery under the common law
approach which holds the actor liable unless he can show his action
privileged.8 Privileges exist because the law recognizes the injurious
act may be justified by some other protected interest. For example,
the privilege of self-defense exists because it is recognized that a man
who is attacked should be allowed to take reasonable steps to defend
himself. The socially protected interest is, however, the safety of the
individual and not his desire for vengeance. Resort to legal processes
is to be made for the settlement of disputes, and the individual is
allowed "self-help" only where society cannot adequately protect him
otherwise. Under this approach a battery in response to verbal abuse
is not privileged, because there are no countervailing interests suffi-
cient to justify the act. The law provides remedies where the words
are sufficiently outrageous' or slanderous,' and to allow an individual
3. Landry v. Himel, 176 So. 627, 629 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937).
4. Morneau v. American Oil Co., 272 So. 2d 313, 315 n.3, 4 (La. 1973). Various
restatements of the rule exist in the cases, e.g.: "[P]rovocative words may be pointed
to as justification for an assault provided those were such that under the circumstances
it should have been assumed that physical retaliation would be attempted." Gross v.
Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 25 So. 2d 837, 840 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946).
5. Morneau v. American Oil Co., 272 So. 2d 313, 315 (La. 1973), citing Richardson
v. Zuntz, 26 La. Ann. 313 (1874).
6. 272 So. 2d at 316.
7. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 19, at 110 n.30 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
8. The following discussion of privilege is adapted from PROSSER §§ 16, 19.
9. See PROSSER § 12.
10. Id. § 11.1.
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to ignore these remedies and indulge in self-help serves no social
purposes.
In contrast, under the aggressor doctrine, provocative words
might have the effect of excusing a battery, since the crucial question
is not whether the assailant was privileged in his act but whether the
injured party was free of fault in the incident." This requirement of
an innocent plaintiff has been criticized as being simply an inappro-
priate application of the equitable doctrine of "clean hands,"' 2 al-
though others" have found support for the doctrine in article 2315 of
the Louisiana Civil Code. 4
Because that article places the responsibility for reparations on
the party who caused the damage by his "fault," it has been said that
if a plaintiff has provoked the incident that resulted in his injury, this
"fault" should preclude recovery.15 However, this article offers no
theoretical basis for the doctrine. The question should not be who
originated the disturbance, but who has breached those legal duties
imposed upon him.' 6 Although the supreme court has rejected as
futile any attempt to precisely define "fault," it has indicated that
the concept involves a breach of some duty imposed on the individ-
11. The focus of the rule is on the party seeking recovery: "One who is himself in
fault cannot recover damages .... " Vernon v. Bankston, 28 La. Ann. 710, 711 (1876).
In Smith v. Parker, 59 So. 2d 718, 720 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1952), it was stated that the
aggressor "forfeits the right of recovery for injuries received .
12. Note, 14 FORD. L. REV. 95 (1945).
13. See Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: The Aggressor Doctrine, 21 TUL. L.
REV. 362 (1947). Professor Stone indicates the doctrine originated in the writings of
Alfrenus on the Lex Aquila but does not trace its reception into Louisiana law.
14. "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by
whose fault it happened to repair it ...." LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315.
15. A typical statement of this preclusion is given in Smith v. Parker, 59 So. 2d
718, 720 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1952): "In the application of tort responsibility under Article
2315, LSA-C.C., which provides that one who is at fault ... is under an obligation to
repair it, a plaintiff, who by his or her conduct provokes a difficulty and is the aggres-
sor, thereby forefeits the right of recovery for injuries received as a result thereof."
16. Planiol states that occasionally the fault of the victim may be the sole cause
of his injury in which case no one else can be held responsible. Where the victim is
partially at fault with the actor, he indicates that there should be a partial recovery:
"Moreover it often happens that the fault of the victim is not the sole cause of the
damage, and that the fault is shared. In that case the victim cannot be denied the right
to sue under the pretext that he was at fault. The responsibility is apportioned accord-
ing to the gravity of the faults committed respectively by the author and by the victim,
and partial recovery takes place." 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE no. 869c, 899 (La.
St. L. Inst. transl. 1959). This doctrine is of course a type of comparative fault and is
functionally similar to allowing the actions of the victim to be considered in mitigation
of damages.
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ual.'7 In cases of verbal abuse such as presented by the facts of the
instant case, the aggressor doctrine, if founded on article 2315, could
not bar the aggressor's recovery, since he has breached no duty.',
Aggression and fault are not synonymous,'" and if plaintiff's conduct
is not an invasion of a legally protected interest, he is not at fault
under article 2315.
However, even in cases where the aggressor has breached some
duty and is thereby "at fault," there should be no authority in article
2315 for excusing the subsequent tortious acts of his victim. Force
should only be allowed as a proper response to force where a valid
social interest exists, as in the traditional privileges for acts in defense
of persons or property. Under civilian principles, force exercised
merely to injure is an abuse of rights, even if a right to so act would
otherwise exist. 2 Additionally, article 2315 should not be interpreted
as an authorization of retaliatory acts as punishment for injuries
suffered instead of requiring resort to legal processes. As the court in
the instant case indicated, this would be "contrary to our system of
justice under law which commands the use of judicial process rather
than force for the settling of disputes." '2'
Consideration of the verbal provocation in relation to mitigation
of damages avoids the authorization of illegal retaliation and yet
allows the court the opportunity to avoid manifestly unfair results.
Mitigation of damages is universally allowed in other jurisdictions,
but the authorities are divided as to whether only punitive or also
actual damages can be reduced. 2 The majority view is the former;2 3
however, because Louisiana law does not allow punitive damages, 24
apparently the supreme court's holding in the instant case contem-
17. Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133, 137 (1971). In
Robert Hale, Inc. v. Gaiennie, 102 So. 2d 324, 325 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1958), it was
said: "[1In order for there to be fault there must first be some legal obligation or duty
which has been breached." See also Marsalis v. LaSalle, 94 So. 2d 120 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1957).
18. Thus the holding in the instant case could be considered consistent with the
aggressor doctrine properly applied.
19. For a discussion of the factors taken into consideration by the courts in deter-
mining "aggression" see Comment, 12 LA. L. REV. 469 (1952).
20. "It is nevertheless impossible in society to permit the holder of a right to
exercise it, when he has no real interest in doing so, and does it only to injure another
person. It is said in such cases that there is an abuse of right." 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW
TREATISE no. 871b (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
21. Morneau v. American Oil Co., 272 So. 2d 313, 316 (La. 1973).
22. PROSSER § 19, at 110.
23. Id.
24. Vincent v. Morgan's La. & T.R. & S.S. Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 So. 541 (1917).
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plates that actual damages can be reduced.25 Although mitigation of
damages has been criticized as having the same thoretical objections
as allowing the provocation as a full defense,26 article 2323 of the Civil
Code does authorize an examination of the actions of an injured party
in the computation of damages. 27
In the instant case, the court made clear that one who commits
assault or battery cannot justify his tort by pointing to the words of
the victim as provocation. It is unfortunate that the court did not use
this opportunity to repudiate the aggressor doctrine in its entirety.
The doctrine is inconsistent with traditional notions of assault, bat-
tery, and privilege, 2 and no clear authority exists for it in Louisiana
law. A repudiation of the doctrine would not do violence to civilian
principles. The basis of tort liability in Louisiana is the invasion of
legally protected interests, just as it is at common law. 21 Our law
would be well served by completely rejecting the aggressor doctrine
and replacing it with a consistent inquiry into the scope of duties
imposed and privileges granted.
Terrence George O'Brien
WHO Is AN EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE?
Louisiana's workmen's compensation law provides that an in-
jured employee may maintain a suit for damages against a "third
person" other than the employer without affecting his right to receive
25. In the instant case, the court found the words insufficient to merit any
mitigation.
26. Note, 13 NOTRE DAME LAW. 332 (1938).
27. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323: "The damage caused is not always estimated at the
exact value of the thing destroyed or injured; it may be reduced according to circum-
stances, if the owner . . . has exposed it imprudently." For a discussion of this article
as authority for a doctrine of comparative fault see Malone, Comparative Negli-
gence-Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 LA. L. REV. 125 (1945).
28. The relevance of such traditional considerations as the presence of a "cooling-
off"' period or the use of excessive force is also questionable under the aggressor doc-
trine. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 Term-Torts,
26 LA. L. REV. 459, 517 (1966).
29. Professor Stone has written: "The end of the law of tort consists in the produc-
tion and maintenance of a harmonious balance among the conflicting forces and inter-
ests of society, and in the affording and protection of an opportunity to all members
of the community to realize the maximum of liberty which is consonant with the best
interest of that society of which they are a part." Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana:
The Materials for the Decision of a Case, 17 TUL. L. REV. 159 (1942).
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